There have been a number of
arguments made hoping to develop a naturalistic account of open alternatives
that would support moral responsibility. However, many of the problems such
arguments run into can be avoided with an account that does not require choices
among open alternatives, but rather on choices that are one’s “own” choices.
This kind of argument rests upon the issue of authenticity. The question is not whether one could have chosen
differently but whether one’s choice genuinely reflects one’s true commitments.
Harry Frankfurt is one of the more influential advocates of the authenticity
approach.
While this “hierarchical
authenticity” approach, as it is called, offers some important insights, it too
fails as a justification for moral
responsibility. Frankfurt’s example of the “willing addict” reveals the
difficulty. The “willing addict” is someone who, according to Frankfurt’s
argument, has no alternative to taking drugs, but is nonetheless free and
morally responsible because she reflectively approves and endorses her desire
and addiction.
The psychological state of the unwilling addict is easy enough to
understand: all of us have experienced strong, and maybe even addictive desires
that we actively disapprove of for such things as chocolate, coffee, sweets,
video games, pornography, soap operas, or Facebook. We may toy with our
particular “poison,” thinking we can remain in control, and then some of us
find ourselves trapped in an addiction we regret and perhaps even despise… but
what can we do? Such an unwilling addict is obviously not free, and though the
path to such unwilling addiction is clear to see and understand, the path to willing addiction is not so clear.
What is the psychological
experience of the willing addict? At some point, his only desire is for his
addictive substance, he clings to it and finds no pleasure in anything other
than his addiction. He has become “willing” but having lost the desire to
escape his addiction, can we honestly say that he has now gained freedom and
moral responsibility as Frankfurt’s argument would suppose? The only reason a
philosopher such as Frankfurt could lead himself to such an argument is his
ideological commitment to save moral responsibility! The shadow implication of
holding to this argument are the “happy slaves,” “contented peasants” and women
who were “happy with their lot until outside, intellectual, feminists started
to stir them up.” When a theory implies that an oppressed class of people can
end up “satisfied with their lot” and thus be considered “free” because
“willing,” there is something wrong with that theory!
The western philosophical
tradition has consistently drawn a clear distinction between having and not
having free will. Various philosophers may offer drastically different accounts
of free will, but they agree in setting a clear and firm boundary between who
does and does not have free will, and under what conditions does free will
operate or not operate. Such a boundary itself is based upon the two demands
that 1. free will and moral responsibility must go together and, 2. that there
must be a clear standard for who is and who is not morally responsible. The
naturalistic free will model – one which is consistent with the buddhist
teaching of anatta and contingency – argues that there is no
such clear line between the haves and the have-nots and no clear standard
actually exists.
The buddhist understanding is
that the only ‘free will’ that can be spoken about is “relative” or
“conditioned” free will and that while all such “willing” is conditioned, there
is a matter of degree that allows this relative freedom to be enhanced or
weakened by circumstances, training (practice),
skillfulness, and cognitive ability and functionality.
Was the unreflective soldier who
looked on or actively participated in the humiliation of prisoners in Abu Graib
morally responsible? Was the child soldier in Somalia who killed those he was
instructed to kill morally responsible. Is Jared Lee Loughner morally
responsible for his shooting spree that killed and wounded 18 people at a shopping
center? These kinds of questions demand clear
black-and-white answers because the answers will determine whether the people
in question will or will not be subject to blame and punishment. And yet, the difficulties
with drawing such a clear, unambiguous line are indicated by the continuing
problems the judicial system confronts in establishing a clear standard for "not
guilty by reason of insanity." What continues to be avoided in this discussion
is that such difficulty is itself an indication that there is not a clear line
between being and not being morally responsible because there is no clear line
dividing having and not having free will!
With the acknowledgement of
not-self and the absence of unconditioned free will, there is no moral
responsibility. Without moral responsibility, we can acknowledge that there is
no fixed marker between having and not having free will, and thus free from
creating a dubious boundary, we can more clearly look into the multiple factors
that strengthen or weaken (relative) free will.
Such factors as greater knowledge, greater self-awareness, a stronger sense of locus-of-control, a stronger sense of self-efficacy, a supportive environment, a developed facility for self-control and higher-order reflectiveness all contribute to a stronger and healthier conditioned free will. Someone with these attributes will have a level of such ‘free will’ superior to someone who lacks such attributes and conditions. It is important and helpful to recognize this distinction and through careful investigation of the factors that nurture such a character, work to create these supportive conditions for all people.
What is presented here is a
plausible and workable account of free will that does not support moral
responsibility (and the concomitant punishment and blame) and recognizes the
completely conditioned nature of will. That the conditioning exists on a
continuum from the phenomenological experience of complete compulsive behavior
to the experience of choosing among alternative modes of response means there
is no absolute of acausal free will, but that willing itself can be influenced
by our current actions feeding into the matrix of conditions. If we are
fortunate enough to have been exposed to practices such as mindfulness
meditation, and have the conditions supportive of such practice, we will have
greater ‘freedom,’ but we cannot take any praise for having done so!
