Sunday, June 3, 2012

All Beings Are Without Blame (Part Three)


I think it safe to say that without a doubt, the unease and resistance people feel when confronted with the argument against “moral responsibility,” comes from the difficulty they have with what becomes of “free will.” After all, “free will” and “moral responsibility” are generally seen as inseparable. And, when both are based upon the assumption of some supernatural, transcendent soul or essence, known as atman in the Indian philosophical context, acting completely independently of causality, then yes, such a free will and moral responsibility are indeed inseparable. This inseparability is well-voiced by Janet Radcliffe Richards: “Free will is thought of as the capacity to be genuinely responsible for actions and genuinely deserving of praise or blame for the choices that are made.” (2000, 136)

This inseparable connection between free will and moral responsibility forms the generally unquestioned assumption behind all arguments for moral responsibility. Libertarians assert that their viewpoint supports both free will and moral responsibility; compatibilists believe that their view can accommodate both free will and moral responsibility, and hard determinists argue that determinism makes both free will and moral responsibility impossible. The common thread here is that free will and moral responsibility either stand or fall together!

But again, this understanding of the inseparability of free will and moral responsibility arises only because the account usually given of free will was originally developed to support moral responsibility: that is, to support the claim that it is fair and just to punish and reward because individuals could always choose to do otherwise independent of all causality!

A solid, naturalistic conceptualization of free will – one that the buddhist tradition holds – is possible, and it can be held without having to hold the view of moral responsibility.

Let us begin by asking “What is free will?” The most “person on the street” definition would seem to be that it is the ability to make a free choice among alternatives. If we then ask, “So, why do you want to be able to make your own choices among alternatives?” the responses tend to be weak and circular: “I want to make my own choices because I don’t want to be forced to choose anything in particular.” The weakness and circularity of the reasoning is an indication that the desire for freedom is so deeply embedded in our nature, that it is hard to give any further justification.

Evolutionary biologists have discovered that our very survival depends upon us keeping our options open! Even mice have a degree of variability built into their behavior, so that once they’ve learned a path to food in a laboratory setting, they still will occasionally choose an “incorrect” path. This variability is adaptive to conditions in the wild. Food isn’t always to be found in the same direction; there are many relationships in the natural setting that are not so strictly prescribed. The same holds true for humans; those with very rigid behaviors are at a disadvantage in a world that is always changing. The inclination toward exploring options is part of what psychologists call “sensation-seeking.”

The natural need for open alternatives is an important element of freedom. It involves “spontaneous behavior.” This isn’t the acausal, miraculous ability to act free of any antecedent causes and conditions, but simply the natural desire to occasionally take a different approach to a given situation, to try something new, and to deviate from the pattern. It is a “conditioned” evolved tendency toward spontaneous action: those animals that tried new paths found more food and more escape routes and thus were more likely to survive, procreate, and pass along their tendencies to deviate.

This “relative” free will depends upon conditions! We need freedom to respond differently when environmental conditions change, and our natural inclination to preserve options was itself shaped and determined in such a way as to make our behavior more adaptive to the changing environmental conditions.

The buddha did not isolate “will” from among all other mental formations as being absolutely free and unconditioned. I did not choose the conditions that made me open to try buddhist mediation practice. That I did was conditioned by my inclination to try alternatives. Some alternatives (like homeopathy) I found lacking and useless and so dropped them; meditation proved valuable and I kept up the practice. The practice itself became a cause and condition that determine my behavior. I do not “deserve” any praise for my having taken up the practice, nor in continuing the practice and changing my unwholesome behaviors toward more wholesome ones, though I did choose to do so freely!

Richards, Janet Radcliffe. 2000. Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction. New York: Routledge.

12 comments:

Tom Clark said...

Thanks for this series, very important stuff. If you haven't already mentioned it, I highly recommend Bruce Waller's book Against Moral Responsibility, reviewed at http://www.naturalism.org/Wallerreview.htm

Matthias said...

Dear Frank, could you please say some clearing words to what you exactly mean when you say that "...the natural need for open alternatives is an important element of freedom.” Do you have a concept of free will in mind that requires indeterminism or is your free will concept compatible with determinism?

Tom Clark said...

Thanks for this series, very important stuff. If you haven't already mentioned it, I highly recommend Bruce Waller's book Against Moral Responsibility, reviewed at http://www.naturalism.org/Wallerreview.htm

Poep Sa Frank Jude said...

Hi Tom,

Thanks for your comment. I guess I should highlight that Waller's book is actually the inspiration for this series! I mention that fact in the first essay, but as the series itself would not be possible without his work, I will reiterate it's importance!

Matthias Mauderer said...

On a naturalists blog, George Ortega (http://causalconsciousness.com/) has noted that "...it seems counterproductive to use the term free will in the way" you're "using it, when it already has an established historical meaning that's different. Frank seems to be asserting that our will is free when it comes to adapting to new conditions, but causality would prohibit that freedom."
Could you please comment on that remark?

Poep Sa Frank Jude said...

Matthias,

If I understand your question correctly, I'd say that what I am trying to convey in that sentence is based upon the rat experiments I mention. Though laboratory rats learn that food is reliably certain to be found in a particular location, they will STILL occasionally try a different route. The generally accepted naturalist explanation is that in nature/natural setting as opposed to the laboratory, if a rat found food in one place and then always returned to that location using the same route, it would have less a chance of survival than a rat that "spontaneously" tried alternatives. This choice making is naturally conditioned or determined.

So, the "need for open alternatives" is naturally conditioned. Perhaps any particular route taken is either 'strictly determined' or randomly indeterminate, I'm not sure how we'd know. I personally tend to go with determinism on this. What do you think?

Matthias said...

Frank,
I for myself tend to think that at its core the universe is indeterminate, but when it comes to decision processes, we can assume determinism for several reasons (size of brain particles, temperature etc.). So the choice making of the rat is deterministic while choosing one route and also deterministic while choosing the other route.

Poep Sa Frank Jude said...

Matthias,

In saying that the universe is indeterminate you mean random? I guess at the quantum level this would be so. Is this what you mean by "at its core the universe is indeterminate?"

Matthias said...

Frank,
there are several interpretations of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen, many worlds...). If I understand it correctly, some interpret the indeterminism as belonging to the reality of the universe, others say reality is totally deterministic but our capacities to predict are worse when it comes to quantum processes. I don´t know. But it seems obvious that randon processes if belonging to reality could never strenghten our ability to act freely, whatever that may be. Randomness isn´t a solution to free will. For more on determinism, take a look at that: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2011/12/05/on-determinism/

Poep Sa Frank Jude said...

Mathias,

Yes, there are more interpretations of quantum mechanics than the Copenhagen and one of my own pet 'bug-bears' is the new-agey (Deepak Chopra) misapplication of quantum mechanics based upon the Copenhagen interpretation.

I'm not sure what I said that may have led you to believe I think quantum randomness (if it is truly part of the 'fabric of reality') is some key to 'free will.' My whole argument in this series is that there is no acausal free will. With the lack of any agency independent of contingency, there is no basis for praise or blame; thus I am arguing against the retributive/punitive form of (so-called) "justice."

Matthias said...

Frank, I don´t think that you think quantum randomness is a key to free will. I just thought it could be important to mention it because many people confuse indeterminism with free will. You, of course, don´t belong to them. I like your approach to show that all beings are without blame. I often catch me blaming myself for being the person I am now. I often think it could have turned out otherwise with the help of my control/agency. So your words are very important to me. I am a stench naturalist but my introspection seems to fool me. Perhaps you have some patent remedy for me :-)

Poep Sa Frank Jude said...

Matthias, I smiled when I read your opening line above: "I don't think you think...." A perfect example of how difficult it can be to communicate clearly through this 'blog-technology.' I'm sure -- as Glenn often repeats -- it would be much smoother over a Guinness!

It's actually because I'm acutely aware that many people confuse indeterminism with free will that I thought you might be thinking I was one of those who do so!

I am emphasizing this phrase "All beings are without blame," because though I first heard it in a zen context, my experience of many contemporary buddhists (the 'x-buddhists') seem to 'flinch' from the implications of anatta and take on a "heroic" kind of ideal regarding behavior. It's like: "There is no self, but YOU are totally responsible for your actions and you can make your vows and change."

One question I ask my students studying the precepts is, "In the light of 'not-self,' who takes the precepts?" in order to get them to at least begin to see through their self-conceit.

Sadly, I've no "patent remedy," other than saying that taking the anatta teaching seriously, and keeping up to date with contemporary neural science has honed my meditation practice in order to understand how my introspection can fool me into thinking there's some independently existent acausal agent.

By the way, thanks for your taking time to comment; it is greatly appreciated!